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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Additional Thoughts on Western Europe
Post Czechoslovakia

1. West Europe and NATO. NATO's future may be strongly influenced by the rapid Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Alliance's present concept of warning time, which presupposes a period of critical consultation by the Allies and military buildup by prospective attackers, is being re-evaluated. The West Germans have been particularly insistent on this action, pointing to the massive Soviet forces near Bavaria and to the jamming of the early warning radar system there. The recent trend of force reductions and redeployments within NATO is likely to be halted by a collective pledge to freeze current levels pending a review of the European security situation.

2. This review process may be completed during September for consideration by Alliance defense ministers at a special October meeting in Bonn of the Defense Planning Committee -- which includes all members except France; a proposal has also been made by the British to move up the North Atlantic Council ministerial conference to November from the December dates presently scheduled. These sessions would probably satisfy most national reactions to Chancellor Kiesinger's vague reference to the need for a NATO summit meeting. Italy has privately called for a twenty-year extension of the NATO Treaty but may offer a less ambitious proposal that each member, perhaps via parliamentary resolutions, agree not to exercise withdrawal rights for a mutually agreed period.

3. European Unity. To the majority of West European commentators and officials the Czech crisis has once more highlighted the need for speedier movement towards political unity in Western Europe -- in the interest both of improved security and detente. The obstacles, however, to strengthening

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and enlarging the European Communities as the natural base for this unity will not go away of themselves and even greater initiative than has been evident recently on the part of the pro-Europeans may be necessary if advantage is to be taken of the new situation. The response to the Soviet action has not blunted the differences between official French views on the minimal role to be accorded to Western Europe unity in moving towards an eventual European solution and the prevailing views elsewhere among the Five that Western Europe would be more effective vis-a-vis the East if it spoke with one voice.

4. The Czech crisis has provoked probably the strongest official responses from Bonn, but West Germany's protestations of the need for strengthening Western Europe are still regarded suspiciously by its Community partners -- especially when the Germans themselves admit they are no more ready than earlier to confront Paris directly on its views of European integration. The British, meanwhile, have reaffirmed their interest only in full membership in the Communities, but have not attempted to capitalize on the situation in Eastern Europe to make any strong appeal for urgency in Western European integration. The debate over strengthening the Community through British membership has already begun with a series of bilateral visits among the Six. These talks have covered no new ground. Paris can be expected in the wake of the Czech crisis to cite its "anti-bloc" policy in opposing enlargement or strengthening of the Community.

5. Attitudes on US-USSR Relations. De Gaulle views the Soviet invasion as an exercise of the "doctrine of power blocs, a consequence of the Yalta accords." The French have indicated they will pursue their anti-bloc policy and are negative on the possibility of a NATO or WEU summit meeting. While all West European states are deeply concerned about the current European security situation, there has been no indication to date -- with the possible exception of West Germany -- of revised plans aimed at raising defense expenditures.

6. The occupation of Czechoslovakia has undermined the strong detente concerns of such nations as Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark. There is general concern that US-Soviet relations not harden to such an extent that cooperative acts

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such as the proposed strategic arms limitation talks and the drafting of the NPT cannot be contemplated in the future. There also are traces of an underlying concern that the US recognizes a de facto Soviet sphere of influence of indefinite extent in Eastern Europe. This viewpoint coalesces with the oft-expressed fear that Alliance security guarantees may evaporate during the duration of the NPT; both West Germany and Italy are using the Czechoslovak situation as an excuse to postpone signature of the NPT.

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